A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty by Robertson, Dario F.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 2
1-1-1978
A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of
Tribal Sovereignty
Dario F. Robertson
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dario F. Robertson, A New Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 6 Am. Indian L. Rev. 371 (1978),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss2/4
NOTES AND COMMENTS
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE
DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Dario F. Robertson *
Introduction: The Nature of the Problem
The traditional analytical approach to the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty is reflected in Chief Justice John Marshall's observa-
tion that the "condition of the Indians in relation to the United
States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence."' Those often cited words have come to epitomize
modern judicial thinking on the subject.2 While the Indian's legal
status may be correctly considered sui generis in many respects,
such a superficial conceptualization is too often invoked as a sur-
rogate for more cogent, precise analysis, obstructing the orderly
development of Indian law as required by the implications of prin-
ciple and precedent.' This note will argue that the long line of
Supreme Court cases interpreting the doctrine of tribal sovereign-
ty is in large measure the product of an ad hoc decision-making
process unguided by a unifying analytical framework, and pro-
poses an alternative constitutional approach which attempts to
rectify the perceived theoretical shortcomings.
Two Supreme Court cases decided last term illustrate the need
for a unifying theoretical explication of the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe" the Court
*First Place Winner, 1979 Indian Law Writing Competition. B.A. 1977, Marquette
University, Magna Cum Laude, J.D. expected 1980, Northwestern University.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). See also United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1896).
2. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974); McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886);
F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 90 (1942) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]; Rice, The Position of
the American Indian in the Law of the United States, 16 J. CoMp. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 79, 90
(1934).
3. E. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-5 (1949). It is, of course, the very
essence of Levi's thesis that the decisional processes of the courts rely upon a very fun-
damental form of reasoning by example as a means of assimilating each new factual
scenario into the case law. It is the artfully crafted analogy that bridges disparate settings
under the same legal theory. Where the theory and the facts are in some sense suigeneris,
analogies are less helpful, precedent easier to circumvent, principles less precise. See
generally Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).
4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In Oliphant, the petitioner-defendant had been charged with
assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest during the Suquamish's annual Chief Seattle
Days celebration. The Court also disposed of a companion case involving the arrest of a
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considered the question of whether Indian tribal courts have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with the commis-
sion of offenses on a reservation.5 Although neither the treaty
entered into with the Suquamish nor any other congressional
enactment affirmatively divested the tribal courts of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court held that this particular
attribute of tribal sovereignty had been implicitly extinguished as
a consequence of the tribe's acceptance of the supervening
sovereignty of the United States. In short, the asserted jurisdiction
was; viewed as impliedly inconsistent with the tribe's dependent
status.7
Some two weeks later, the Court handed down United States v.
Wheeler, holding that the inherent tribal sovereignty of the Nava-
jos was sufficiently independent of federal sovereignty to trigger
the "dual sovereignty" concept implicit in the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment. The Court permitted successive
tribal and federal prosecutions of an Indian defendant for offenses
arising out of the same incident, rejecting the argument that the
jurisdiction of the tribal and federal courts sprang from the same
sovereignty.' In reaching that result, the Court summarized the
quasi-sovereign status of the tribes as follows:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Con-
gress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Con-
gress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In
non-Indian for recklessly endangering another person and injuring tribal property during a
high-speed chase that ended in a collision with a tribal police car.
5. Id. at 195.
6. Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1855).
7. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion extensively surveys numerous other treaty provisions in an at-
tempt to establish a long-standing congressional assumption that the various tribes were
without criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent an express delegation of such power.
Id. at 197-207. But this analysis is ostensibly rendered superfluous by the Court's conclu-
sion that "even ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, Indians do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians..." as such jurisdiction has been withdrawn by im-
plication as a necessary result of their dependent status.
8. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). In Wheeler, the defendant-respondent, a member of the Navajo
Tribe, had been convicted of disorderly conduct and contributing to the delinquency of a
minor in violation of Title 17, § 321, of the Navajo Tribal Code (1969). Over a year later,
respondent was indicted in federal district court under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1976). Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that because there was
an identity of sovereignties between the tribal and federal courts and because he had
already been convicted of a lesser included offense of statutory rape, the subsequent federal
prosecution was barred. 435 U.S. at 315-16. See also Note, CriminalJurisdiction: Double
Jeopardy in Indian Country, this issue.
9. Id. at 329-30.
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sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty
not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.'"
The Court was careful to distinguish Oliphant, noting that the
sovereign power to punish Indian offenders was not necessarily
"lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status.""
Both Oliphant and Wheeler are engulfed by the analytical
quagmire that has plagued the doctrine of tribal sovereignty since
its inception. First, tribal sovereignty, unlike that which inheres in
other autonomous entities, is without an irreducible normative
core. It is subject to complete defeasance. Second, the doctrine is
so vague that any specific powers of self-government which re-
main vested in the tribes cannot be objectively determined in ad-
vance of a pronouncement by the Court. There is neither a prin-
cipled method of determining which powers the tribes have retain-
ed nor which powers have been implicitly invested. The ill-defined
principle of divestiture-by-implication announced in Oliphant
must rely upon the unfettered, unguided discretion of the review-
ing court for its containment or extension. No countervailing
principle of limitation circumscribes the applicability of the
Oliphant analysis to other sovereign tribal powers heretofore.
viewed as retained.
Wheeler is susceptible to a similar criticism. The Court in
Wheeler purports to recognize a "primeval sovereignty"'" in the
tribes of sufficient independent integrity to justify the invocation
of the dual sovereignty concept of the fifth amendment, yet
simultaneously announces that whatever sovereignty the tribes re-
tain may be completely eradicated by a simple majority of Con-
gress. What kind of sovereignty can be said to exist at the whim of
a superior sovereign? Is not tribal subservience to such plenary
authority tantamount to a negation of any asserted residuum of
sovereignty? The Court has never faced this apparent paradox,
10. Id. at 323.
11. Id. at 326. The majority opinion enumerated three areas in which implicit divestiture
of sovereignty had been recognized by the Court. First, Indian tribes lost the sovereign
power to alienate tribal lands freely to non-Indians as a result of their dependent status.
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974); Johnson v. M'In-
tosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Second, their sovereign capacity to enter into
direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations has been impliedly ter-
minated. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Third, their sovereign
power to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been extinguished. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
12. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 317,328 (1978).
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nor has it attempted to derive a modern justification for this
anachronistic doctrine.
The amorphous contours of the doctrine have discouraged
courts from relying on the sovereignty concept, as recent cases
prior to Wheeler make clear. The Court in McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Commission'3 noted that "the trend has been away
from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty..." toward reliance
on the more familiar doctrines of federal preemption and ad-
ministrative delegation." The McClanahan Court concluded that
"modern cases.., tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of In-
dian sovereignty and look instead to the applicable treaties and
statutes .... "" This understandable tendency to perceive notions
of tribal sovereignty as undefined and antiquarian has led to a
gradual but persistent doctrinal erosion.
This note will argue that the tribal sovereignty doctrine has
gradually been incorporated into the conceptual fabric of modern
federalism to such an extent as to allow courts to declare the doc-
trine explicitly constitutionalized. This would have the effect of
conferring upon the tribes a degree of constitutionally inviolate
sovereignty. Alternatively, it will be argued that absent explicit
constitutionalization, courts should at the very least rely upon the
state sovereignty doctrine as a dispositive analogue in ad-
judicating cases involving tribal sovereignty questions.
The Concept of Sovereignty
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty is a unique theoretical con-
struct floating amidst a vast sea of literature dealing with the con-
cept of sovereignty.'" Theorists in the classical and neo-classical
normative tradition define sovereignty as a right to govern, as an
inherent entitlement to the exercise of political power which does
not depend on a present capability to exercise that power. Essen-
13. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
14. Id. at 172. Rather than relying upon notions of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar
to state jurisdiction, courts have felt more comfortable construing federal statutes granting
certain powers to tribes as indicative of an intention to occupy the field to the exclusion of
the states.
15. Emphasis added. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148
(1973) (traditionally broad notions of tribal sovereignty have given way to more in-
diviclualized treatment of specific treaties and statutes); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962) (notion of Indian reservation as a distinct nation has been substan-
tially eroded with the passage of time).
16. A detailed analysis of the multivarious theories of sovereignty is obviously beyond
the scope of this note. For an excellent discussion of the history and diversity of modern
sovereignty theories, see generally H. COHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (1937); C.
MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU (1900).
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tially, normativists reduce sovereignty to a legal right." Thus, the
judiciary is attitudinally predisposed toward the normative theory
because it renders the notion of sovereignty susceptive to the same
sort of juridical analysis to which other legal rights are
susceptible. 8
When examined in these terms, the concept of sovereignty loses
much of its mystique. Its explication becomes a preeminently
juristic, nonlegislative function. With a synopsis of the broader
implications of the docrine of tribal sovereignty in mind, it will be
much easier to put the following historical exegesis in the proper
perspective.
The Evolution of the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty
In addition to being ambiguous, the application of European
concepts of sovereignty may rest on a historical fallacy. It should
be emphasized at the outset that Western notions of sovereignty
may be ill-suited to describe the reality of pre-Columbian tribal
autonomy." Perhaps sovereignty is a culturally tainted concept
17. This normative approach can be traced to the intellectual matrix of Medieval Europe
which added a distinctive gloss to the newly rediscovered political theories of the classicists.
One scholar of political theory explains that the "thought that State and Law exist by, for,
and under each other was foreign to the Middle Ages. It solved the problem by opposing to
Positive Law the idea of Natural Law. This idea, which came to it from Classical Antiquity,
it proceeded to elaborate." 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES 74 (F.
Maitland tr. 1900). Ultimately, other commentators suggest, "medieval theorists confound-
ed the Law of Nature with the Law of God....," resulting in the coalescence of modern nor-
mative theorization. R. EASTWOOD & G. KEETON, THE AUSTINIAN THEORIES OF LAW AND
SOVEREIGNTY 41, 43-60 (1929) (discussing the normative theories in contrast to Austinian
positivism).
18. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793) ("Sovereignty is the right to
govern.") See Note, The American Indian-Tribal Sovereignty and Civil Rights, 51 IOWA L.
REV. 654, 655-56 (1966).
19. Tribal political structures varied significantly. Some structures appear more
analogous to Western nation-states than others. The noted Indian historian Wilcomb
Washburn has commented: "White assumptions about Indian political organization range
all the way from the belief that they were totally autocratic to the conviction that they were
totally anarchic. As usual the truth is complex and runs between these two poles." W.
WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 42 (1975). Even the Cherokees, who have long been
regarded as possessing one of the most sophisticated tribal governments, may have
historically lacked the degree of political coherence necessary to be accurately described as
a sovereign nation. A recent study of Cherokee law made the following observations: "It is
too strong to call the Cherokee nation a confederacy of towns. At best, it was a collection
of towns populated by a common people. At worst-in times of strife-it was anarchy. Yet
we cannot conclude that there was no national government. When the headmen of certain
towns furnished a leadership that others could follow, the nation became a functional reali-
ty and this occurred as often as not." J. REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: THE PRIMITIVE LAW OF THE
CHEROKEE NATION 33 (1970). See also A. WALLACE, THE DEATH AND REBIRTH OF THE SENECA
14-20 (1972). CF. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 102 (1855) (noting that the Cherokees were
"more advanced in civilization than other Indian tribes... ").
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that should not be applied to atypical political entities existing
outside the self-conscious European community of nation-states.
If indeed the original use of the term "sovereignty" cannot ac-
curately and objectively describe the political condition of the
tribes prior to the intervention of the United States, contemporary
notions of quasi-sovereignty would seem to have built upon
analytically infirm foundations. Perhaps the notion of tribal
sovereignty is simply a juristic convention, a convenient rubric
employed to describe a bundle of loosely linked legal entitlements
conferred upon the Indians by treaties, statutes, judicial decisions,
and common usage. Perhaps the term is only the cause of confu-
sion and should be eliminated altogether." Whatever the merits of
such a position, it is clear that the term cannot be neatly expunged
from the pages of the many opinions in which it appears. Since the
law cannot be rid of the term, some attempt must be made to in-
fuse it with a coherent, consistent meaning. Some attempt must be
made to ascertain its contemporary constitutional significance.
Such an undertaking must of necessity begin with a historical
review of the doctrine's development. The discussion will adhere
to a conceptual scheme of organization that roughly parallels the
chronological evolution of the doctrine."
Tribal Sovereignty as a Principle of Natural Law
As the European nations initiated an aggressive bilateral cam-
paign of Christianization and dispossession in the New World, a
vigorous debate arose among various theologians and jurists con-
cerning the appropriate theoretical justification, if any, for the un-
precedented onslaught against the Indian. That debate was greatly
intensified by reports that the American natives were being sub-
jected to unbridled cruelty and treachery at the hands of the in-
vading Europeans.' The prevailing misconception that the Indians
were half-human barbarians, incapable of true political communi-
20. Even when used in conventional settings, the term is disfavored as one scholar ex-
plains: "The word sovereignty is ambiguous .... We propose to waste no time in chasing
shadows, and will therefore discard the word entirely. The word 'independence' sufficiently
indicates every idea embraced in the use of sovereignty .... R. FOULKE, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1920). Unlike a treatise author, jfi'dges cannot so effortlessly aban-
don a long-standing term of art.
21. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 46-47; W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND-WHITE MANS
LAW 3-23 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WASHBURN]; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN.
L. REV. 28, 43-47 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Cohen, OriginalIndian Title]; Robertson, The
Catholic Mission andIndian Reservations, 3 Soc. THOUGHT 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Robertson].
22. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO
L.J. 1, 9-11 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Cohen, Indian Rights].
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ty or religious conversion, and the resultant abuse engendered by
such ethnocentrism, prompted concerned theorists to derive a
natural law construct of tribal sovereignty that might clothe In-
dian rights with some legitimacy.'
At the center of this intellectual vortex was the work of the
Spanish jurist Francisco de Vitoria who was the first to argue in
1532 that lawful title to Indian lands could not be obtained merely
by virtue of its discovery." Vitoria held that good title could only
be secured from the natives by treating with them as a sovereign
power vested with a natural right of self-government.' Vitoria
originated a novel natural law theory of limited sovereignty, based
on a voluntary relinquishment of certain inherent powers of state
to a sovereign protectorate. He applied his new theory to the
tribes' relationship with the Spanish Crown.' Vitoria founded his
natural law theory of tribal sovereignty on a recognition of the in-
herent capability of the natives to form a sophisticated political
community governed by an overarching scheme of rationality.27
23. See L. HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 122-
25 (1949) [hereinafter cited as HANKE]; Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 22, at 9-16;
Robertson, supra note 21, at 16-20. The humanist scholar Juan Gines de Sepulveda, writing
in the middle of the sixteenth century, argued that the Indians constituted a classic example
of a people who fit the Aristotelian description of natural slaves, being devoid of rationality
and common humanity. In response to such erroneous theoretical speculation, Bar-
tholomew de Las Casas, a missionary to the Indians, composed a voluminous treatise
which did much to dispel many of the early misconceptions. WASHBURN, supra note 21, at
14-17. See also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1254a, 1256b (W. Ross
ed. 1921); G. MACNUTT, BARTHOLOMEW DE LAS CASAS, HIS LIFE, HIS APOSTOLATE AND HIS
WRITINGS 311, 314-16, 411-12 (1909); R. SCHLAIFER, GREEK THEORIES OF SLAVERY FROM
HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 165-69, 182, 201-202 (1936); J. SEPULVEDA, DEMOCRATES ALTER, SIVE
DE JUSTIS BELLI CAUSIS APUD INDOS, in TRATADO SOBRE LAS JUSTAS CAUSAS DE LA GUERRA
CONTRA Los INDIAS 104-105 (1941) (written in 1548 but not published as authorities thought
doctrine unsound in light of Las Casas' writings).
24. F. VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES § 2, 139 (E. Nys. ed. 1917)
[hereinafter cited as VITORIA]. See also COHEN, supra note 2, at 46-47; D. MCNICKLE,
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM 28-29 (1973); WASHBURN, supra note 21, at 9-13. The doctrine
of title-by-discovery originally applied only where the lands sought were not already
possessed. The doctrine was perverted when it was transformed into a theoretical justifica-
tion for the dispossession of Indian lands. This shibboleth was disposed of on an analytical
level by Vitoria, but his efforts failed to have a determinative practical effect on the designs
of the Spanish emperors and their subjects in the New World. Cohen, Original Indian Title,
supra note 21, at 44-45. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543, 544 (1832)
(discovery does not annul preexisting rights of the occupants in the land); Johnson v. M'In-
tosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823) (nation making discovery receives the sole right
of acquiring the soil from the natives); E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS bk. 1, ch. 18, §§
81, 209, at 38, 85 (C. Fenwick tr. 1916) [hereinafter cited as VATrELI.
25. VITORIA, supra note 24, at § 3, 16, at 159.
26. Id.
27. Id. at § 1, 1 23-24, at 127-28. In sharp contrast to the grisly exaggerations of Indian
barbarism received in the early sixteenth century, Vitoria equanimitously argued that
"there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have definite marriage and magistrates,
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Since the Indians were amenable to the rule of reason, a notion at
that time inextricably bound to the law of God, " other nations
could not arbitrarily transgress tribal sovereignty without
themselves committing an irrational act violative of the law of
nature."9
'Vitoria's thesis was to have a profound effect on the shaping of
the doctrine of tribal sovereignty for centuries to come, coloring
even the early decisions of the Supreme Court"0 and formative pro-
nouncements of the Continental Congress pertaining to Indian
relations.'
Whatever the precise historical cause of the incorporation of a
natural law theory of Indian rights into constitutional
jurisprudence, it is clear that by the time Johnson v. M'Intosh
was decided, the Court had come to accept the theory as a
necessary component of any analysis of Indian rights. Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned that title by discovery and conquest
overrode any natural law title the Indian might have held in the
land." Professor Storey objected to Marshall's tacit endorsement
of the doctrine of discovery, contending that "in point of justice or
humanity, or general conformity to the law of nature..."
overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of
reason; they also have a kind of religion .... See HANKE, supra note 23, at 51-52;
WASHBURN, supra note 21, at 9.
28. See text and authorities accompanying note 17 supra.
29. VITORIA, supra note 24, at § 3, 1 16, 159.
30. A noted scholar of Indian law explains: "While Vitoria himself is not directly cited in
any of the early opinions of the United States Supreme Court on Indian cases, these opi-
nions frequently refer to statements by Grotius and Vattel that are either copied or adapted
from the words of Vitoria. It is thus clear that the tradition of legal teaching carried
Vitoria's theories on Indian rights to the judges and attorneys who formulated our legal
doctrine in this field." Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 22, at 17. For examples of the in-
fluence which Grotius and Vattel had on the natural law strand of the tribal sovereignty
doctrine, see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543, 559-61 (1832); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,563,568-69 (1823).
31. Vitoria's natural law theory of Indian rights received papal support in 1537 by the
Bull Sublimis Deusin which Pope Paul III declared that the arbitrary deprivation of liberty
or dispossession of land to which the Indians were properly entitled would not be tolerated.
Professor Cohen has contended that this papal declaration of human rights was repeated
"[ailmost word for word" in the first major congressional pronouncement affecting Indian
relations: the Northwest Ordinance, Act of July 13, 1787, 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 340-41 (1904-1937). Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 22, at 12;
Hanke, Pope Paul III and the American Indians, 30 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV 67, 72-76
(1937). For an excellent summary of the significance of the Northwest Ordinance in Indian
affairs, see F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 37-38 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as PRUCHA].
32. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 147
(1810) (where Marshall's analysis laid the analytical foundation for his opinion in
M'Intosh).
33. Id. at 574, 591-92. Chief Justice Marshall's analysis was given a degree of modern
support in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 285 (1955).
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politically "convenient" theory could not be vindicated." Indian
rights, insisted Storey, "stood upon original principles deductible
from the law of nature, and could not be justly narrowed or ex-
tinguished without their own free consent."35
Chief Justice Marshall retreated from his position in M'Intosh in
the landmark case of Worcester v. Georgia," where he discredited
the doctrine of discovery by deliberately imbuing the formerly
disfavored natural law theory of tribal sovereignty with
dispositive significance. In holding that Georgia was without
jurisdiction to promulgate laws binding within the territory of the
Cherokee Nation,37 the Chief Justice emphasized that the Indian
nations had always been considered "distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural
rights.... "" These natural law rights were held to have survived
discovery of the continent by the Europeans." While the ultimate
ratio decidendi of the case depended both on notions of inherent
tribal sovereignty and the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction," it
was plain that a principle of natural law sovereignty had been ef-
fectively rendered constitutionally tenable. Although the natural
law analysis of tribal sovereignty has fallen into disuse with the
passage of time, it has never been affirmatively abandoned and
may fairly be thought to underlie the many pronouncements of
the modern Court affecting Indian rights.
Tribal Sovereignty as a Principle of International Law
Once the early theorists had decided that sovereignty vested in
the tribes as a natural right, the parallel conclusion logically
followed that such a right should be accorded the protection of the
34. 1 J. STOREY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 4(1833) (emphasis added).
35. Id. Professor Storey thereafter concluded: "There is no doubt, that the Indian tribes,
inhabiting this continent at the time of its discovery, maintained a claim to the exclusive
possession and occupancy of the territory within their respective limits, as sovereigns and
absolute proprietors of the soil." Id. at 5. Thus, notions of Indian sovereignty and land title
were conceived of as being inextricably bound to the law of nature. Id. at 3-15.
36. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). This decided shift in the Marshallian position was
foreshadowed in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831), where the
tribes are characterized as "domestic dependent nations..." constitutionally different from
foreign nations. Id. at 17. Gone was the vague tendency to describe the tribes as natives
with merely a right of occupancy.
37. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.), 515, 561 (1832).
38. Id. at 559.
39. Id. at 543. The Chief Justice declared: "It is difficult to comprehend the proposition,
that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of
dominion over inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the
discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered,
which annulled the preexisting rights of its ancient possessors."
40. Id. at 557.
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jus gentium or the law of nations. Since the natural law was
theoretically predicated on the common elements of humanity and
rationality of mankind, and since international law was analyzed
as a conceptual subset of this all-pervasive rational order, a princi-
ple recognized under natural law a fortiori should receive the
solemn respect of the community of nations."
Although the colonial powers of Europe may not have felt
bound to recognize the sanctity of tribal sovereignty simply
because the esoteric notions of the jus gentium so required, they
were effectively constrained to acknowledge the sovereign status
of the tribes by more practical political considerations. As long as
the Indians possessed the power to make war, tribal sovereignty,
as it was manifested in their assertions of dominion over their peo-
ple and territory, could not be ignored. 2 In dealing with the In-
dians by treaty, a pattern of diplomacy that was to be continued
by the United States, the colonial powers ipso facto gave credence
to the notion that tribal sovereignty should receive the protection
of international law, for as Chief Justice Marshall has stated "[a]
treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations. . . . "'" The
Supreme Court would later come to rely on the fact that recogni-
tion of tribal sovereignty in the international arena antedated that
of the United States."
41. See, e.g., I H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS ch. 2, § 4, at 38(W. Whewell tr.
1853). In another context Grotius asserted that there is an identity between the '7ure
naturali" and the 'ure gentium. "In many cases, the discussions of natural and interna-
tional law proceed sub silentio on the assumption that the two concepts of law are
operatively indistinguishable. VATTEL, supra note 24; VITORIA, supra note 24, § 3, 16, at
159.
42. COHEN, supra note 2, at 39, 274. See also VATTEL, supra note 24, at bks 2. 3, chs. 7,
1, §§ 83, 4, at 138, 235.
43. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). See also 5 HACKWORTH,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1943); VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, Second Session
Off. Rec., U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 39/27 art. 2 (1)(a) (1968-69); CRANDALL, TREATIES-THEIR
MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 93 (1904). Francis Paul Prucha, a leading scholar in the field of
Indian history, has noted: "Treating with the Indians for the extinguishment of land titles
on the basis of colony dealing with tribe, together with the diplomatic negotiations of war
and peace, gave foundation and strength to the doctrine that the Indian tribes were in-
dependent nations with their own rights and sovereignty, rather than subjects of the colony
or nation in whose territory they resided." PRUCHA, supra note 31, at 142.
44. Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283 (1896); Porterfield v. Clark, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 76 (1849); Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4 (1840); Mitchel v. United States, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Preston v.
Browder, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 115 (1816).
Following the revolution, there was a substantial risk that the tribes might be deprived of
their international standing as the young republic embraced the theory that Indian territory
should be considered "conquered provinces." COHEN, supra note 2, at 48. Under this
policy, a congressional commission, appointed in 1784, was to make clear to the tribes that
their lands were forfeit as a consequence of the military victory. W. MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN
RELATIONS, 1774-1788, at 108 (1933). However politically expedient or theoretically defen-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss2/4
Professor Felix Cohen has forcefully argued that under both the
Articles of Confederation and under the Constitution, the national
government, in the first few decades of the Republic, treated the
Indian tribes as sovereign nations with all the then prevailing for-
malities of international diplomacy." Cohen developed a typology
of Indian treaties which attempted to illustrate the de jure
sovereignty accorded the tribes through an analysis of agreements
falling within five substantive categories. He found treaties which
dealt with tribal capacity to make war, 6 territorial boundaries
defining Indian country,47 passport requirements for the entry of
citizens into Indian country," arrangements respecting the extradi-
tion of fugitives," and the relations of tribes with nations other
than the United States" paralleled the sort of bilateral compacts
which completely independent nations might negotiate.,'
The international status ostensibly accorded the tribes exacer-
bated the anomaly of their legal position." How could the tribes be
sible the policy might have been, the discontent it generated among the tribes led to its
ultimate abandonment and an unequivocal return to treaty-making predicated on an
acknowledgment of inherent Indian sovereignty. The "conquered provinces" theory never
amounted to much more than an officially endorsed legal fiction for even while it was the
declared policy of the national government, the Continental Congress continued its use of
treaties, evincing the same solicitude for the tribes that had prevailed since the first treaty
was concluded with the Delawares in 1778. Treaty with the Delawares of Sept. 17, 1778, 7
Stat. 13. Of this agreement, Chief Justice Marshall said: "The language of equality in which
it is drawn evinces the temper with which the negotiation was undertaken .... Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832).
45. COHEN, supra note 2, at 39; PRUCHA, supra note 31, at 142-43.
46. See, e.g., Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of Sept. 27, 1830 with the Choctaw Na-
tion, 7 Stat. 333, 334 (recognizing the power of the Choctaws to make war); Treaty of July
22, 1814, with the Wiandots, 7 Stat. 118 (enlisting the aid of the tribe against Britain in the
War of 1812); Treaty of Jan. 31, 1786, with the Shawanoe Nation, art. 4, 7 Stat. 26
(creating a mutual assistance pact in case of war). See also Montoya v. United States, 180
U.S. 261,267(1901).
47. Boundary lines between the Indian tribes and the United States or other tribes were
fixed by treaty.Treaty of Jan. 21, 1785, with the Wiandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ot-
tawa Nations, 7 Stat. 16; Treaty of Nov. 3, 1804, with the Sac and Fox, 7 Stat. 84; Treaty
of July 4, 1805, with the Wiandot, Ottawa, Chippewa, Munsee, Delaware, Shawnee, and
Pottawatomi nations, 7 Stat. 87. See also, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. (1848) (establishment of boun-
daries was primary purpose of some treaties with the tribes).
48. See, e.g., Treaty of Aug. 7, 1790, with the Creek Nation, art. 7, 7 Stat. 35, 37
(passport from state governor or President required for entry into Indian country); Treaty
of July 2, 1791, with the Cherokee, art. 9, 7 Stat. 39, 40.
49. See, e.g., Treaty of Jan. 21, 1785, with the Wiandots, art. 9, 7 Stat. 16.
50. As late as 1835, Indian relations with other nations were officially recognized by the
federal government. See, e.g., Treaty of Aug. 24, 1835, with the Comanche and others,
art. 9, 7 Stat. 474 (recognizing Indian relations with the Republic of Mexico); Treaty of
May 26, 1837, with the Kiowa and others, 7 Stat. 533 (recognizing Indian relations with the
Republic of Texas).
51. COHEN, supra note 2, at 39-40.
52. Higgins, International Law Considerations of the American Indian Nations by the
United States, 3 ARz. L. REv. 74, 78-81 (1961).
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treated as independent sovereignties, and yet remain subservient
to the government of the United States? Chief Justice Marshall at-
tempted to answer this question in Worcester v. Georgia" by turn-
ing once again to the established principles of international law
when he stated that "the settled doctrine of the law of nations is,
that a weaker power does not surrender its independence- its
right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and tak-
ing its protection," citing Vattel in support of that conclusion."
Chief Justice Marshall described the tribes as "independent
political communities.. . ,"" after having portrayed them as
"domestic dependent nations..." and "wards" of the government
only a year earlier in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," where the
Court explicitly rejected an argument predicating standing to sue
on the tribe's status as a "foreign state" under Article III of the
Constitution." Thus, an integrative reading of these two cases
would lead future courts to struggle with the paradoxical
characterization of the relationship between the tribes and the
United States as one of independent dependence. With such a con-
fused theoretical background, it is little wonder that the sup-
portive role which international law once played in preserving the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty was gradually undermined as later
courts hopelessly entangled themselves in the contradictory
ramifications of precedent."
This already perplexing legal scenario was complicated still fur-
ther by a rider attached to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871
which stated that:
[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
53. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
54. Id. at 560-61. See VATTEL, supra note 24, at bk. 1, chs. 1, 16, §§ 6-8, 192-99, at II-
12, 80-81. Marshall failed to mention a competing principle of international law which Vat-
tel also discusses which stipulates that "a people which has passed under the rule of another
is no longer a State, and does not come directly under the law of nations." Id., ch. 1, 11, at
12, Marshall's declaration of tribal independence was quoted with approval in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
55. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,559 (1832).
56. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
57. Id. at 16-20; U.S. CONST. art. 3.
58. Subsequent decisions discussing the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation illustrate the
difficulties the early Court had in adhering to the principles of international law. See
generally Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN L.
REv. 500 (1969). In Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 362, 374 (1850), the Cherokees were
recognized as being "in many respects a foreign and independent nation.... ", yet
simultaneously in a "state of pupilage... under the guardianship of the United States." Just
five years later in Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. 100, 104 (1855), the Court unequivocally con-
cluded that the legal standing of the Cherokee Nation was virtually indistinguishable from
that of a "territory of the United States." The Court continued, "In no respect. . ." could
the Cherokee Nation be "considered a foreign state or territory ...."
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independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or
impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made
and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe."
In terminating the use of treaties in Indian affairs, had Congress
effectively eviscerated the force of international law as it pertained
to the doctrine of tribal sovereignty? By refusing to recognize the
tribes as "independent" nations, was Congress implicitly endors-
ing Chief Justice Marshall's characterization of the tribes as
"dependent" sovereign entities? Could such a pronouncement be
interpreted as completely eradicating the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty? Had Congress implicitly rejected the validity of the
treaty-making power as a source of federal authority over the
tribes7'
The legislative history of the Act offers no conclusive answers
to these questions.' Apparently, the attachment of the rider was
prompted by the resentment felt by the House of Representatives
as a result of its exclusion from any substantial control of Indian
affairs, rather than by any zealous congressional intention to
undermine the international law underpinnings of the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty." Since the Senate alone ratified the treaties, 3
the House could resort only to fiscal retaliation by denying ap-
propriations for the execution of treaties which it found objec-
tionable. The fact that Congress continued to enter into
agreements which were the de Facto equivalent of treaties further
substantiates the position that the eradication of any notion of
59. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566. Note that this comprehensive ap-
proach was precipitated by the use of provisions in individual treaties calling for the cessa-
tion of treaty-making. See, e.g., Treaty with the Apache and Cheyenne of Feb. 18, 1861,
art. 7, 12 Stat. 1163.
60. Professor Rice has answered this particular question in the affirmative: "The federal
power over Indians having become firmly settled, Congress thus struck down or admitted
to be false the chief constitutional basis of that power." Rice, supra note 2, at 83.
Nonetheless, the courts have continued to recognize the treaty-making power as a basis of
the plenary authority of Congress over Indian affairs. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
61. COHEN, supra note 2, at 66-67.
62. L. SCHMECKEBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND
ORGANIZATION 55-58 (1927). Schmeckebier explains that the underlying cause of the 1871
rider was that the treaties "ratified by the Senate were not acceptable to the House of
Representatives." Id. at 55. See also F. WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 5, 11-12 (1874).
63. U.S. CONST. art 2, § 2.
64. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 62, at 55. For an example of expressions of fiscal retalia-
tion by the House, see Act of Mar. 29, 1867, 15 Stat. 7, 9, repealed byAct of July 20, 1867,
15 Stat. 18.
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tribal autonomy was not uppermost in the minds of the
legislators.'
It would appear, however, that the tribes have, over the years,
lost the attributes of sovereignty that are typically associated with
a foreign state. It is quite conceivable that the force of interna-
tional law in Indian affairs has been altogether extinguished by the
logical implications of the Cayuga Indian Claims Case.' A treaty
between the State of New York and the Cayuga Nation, a tribe of
the Iroquois, concluded in 1789, provided that the Cayugas would
receive a specified annuity in exchange for ceding certain tribal
lands.17 Following the Revolutionary War, a majority of the
Cayugas, who had sided with the British, moved to Canada
because most of their major settlements had been leveled in the
scorched-earth campaign waged by the Continental troops." The
obligatory annuities were paid regularly to tribal leaders in
Canada until the War of 1812, after which annuity payments were
made only to tribal members residing in New York. ' It was not
until 1926 that Great Britain brought an action on behalf of the
Cayugas against the United States before a special international
arbitration tribunal.' Although the tribunal found equitable
grounds on which to base a compensatory award," it expressly
65. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 359 (1908) (upholding the validity of bicameral
pseudo-treaties.); Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 AM. L. REV 21, 25 (1881).
For examples of these treaty-like agreements, see Act of Apr. 29, 1874, with the Utes, 18
Stat. 36; Act of July 10, 1882, with the Crows, 22 Stat. 157; Act of Mar. 1, 1901, with the
Cherokees, 31 Stat. 848.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to read the House rider as further enfeebling Indian
claims of tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903).
Discussions of the applicability of international law principles are infrequent in the opi-
nions of the modern Court and rarely amount to more than dictum. See, e.g., United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 376 (1978).
66. 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 574 (1926).
67. Id., 20 AM. J. INT'L L. at 575-76.
68. Id. See also WALLACE, supra note 19, at 143.
69. 20 AM. J. INT'L L., supra note 66, at 576, 588.
70. It is significant that Britain had considered bringing this action in the United States
Supreme Court as early as 1860. The Crown sought the advice of one Benjamin Curtis, a
former Justice of the Supreme Court, on the question. He counseled Her Majesty that
although the Cayugas did not have standing to maintain the suit in their own name after
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Great Britain could sue the state of
New York on their behalf. J. SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 111-12 (1919); Rice, supra note 2, at 83. See text accompa-
nying notes 56-57 supra.
71. In view of the fact that the proceedings were before an arbitration tribunal rather
than world court strictly bound by the principles of international law, it was felt that
"recourse... to generally recognized principles of justice and fairness. . ." required a com-
pensatory award, especially when "a situation so anomalous. . ." presented itself. Cayuga
Indian Claims Case (Britain v. United States), 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 574, 580-81 (1926) (em-
phasis added).
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pointed out that an Indian "tribe is not a legal unit of international
law..., "" and that the Cayuga Nation had no "international
status." 3 In reaching that result, the tribunal repeatedly empha-
sized the line of Supreme Court opinions focusing on the subor-
dinate, dependent, ward-like status of the tribes.'4 To the extent
that the Cayuga Indian Claims Case represents a persuasive con-
struction of international law, which could conceivably become
the supreme law of the land should the Supreme Court choose to
incorporate the holding of that case into constitutional
jurisprudence,"5 it would appear that tribal sovereignty can no
longer be vigorously defended as a doctrine owing its present
validity to the law of nations.
Tribal Sovereignty as a Principle of Constitutional Law
On a historical level, the logical processes which led the Mar-
shall Court to conclude that the tribal sovereignty principle should
be infused with the force of constitutional law are readily discerni-
ble. Since the principle of tribal sovereignty was viewed as belong-
ing to an omnipresent body of natural and international law
which was generally thought to have retained its binding legal ef-
fect under the unfolding canopy of constitutional jurisprudence,
the metamorphosis of tribal sovereignty from an entirely extra-
constitutional doctrine into a legitimate theory of constitutional
law appeared logically inescapable to the early Justices. As
originally conceived, the Court felt compelled to apply the tribal
sovereignty principle by the mandate of natural and international
law.
It may be, however, that today the original justification for the
recognition of a tribal sovereignty principle has lost its raison
d'etre. No longer do courts feel bound by the natural law. No
longer are the Indian tribes properly subjects of international law.
Thus, it might be asked with good reason if there is anything left
of the notion of inherent tribal sovereignty? By what authority
72. Id. at 577.
73. Id. at 580.
74. Id. at 577-80. The tribunal chose to cite only those cases supporting the view that the
tribes are completely dependent on the federal government: E.g., United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (cited as establishing dependent ward-like status of the tribes);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (characterized tribes as
"domestic, dependent nations"); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 578 (1823)
(endorsed the discredited doctrine of discovery). It is puzzling that the court did not men-
tion the analysis in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), which suggested
the international status of the tribes.
75. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1
(1801).
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may courts apply a principle which has been undermined with the
passage of time? Aside from analytically infirm precedent, there
would appear to be only two sources of authority upon which
courts could rely in applying the tribal sovereignty principle as a
rule of law: the Constitution and congressional legislation. As yet,
the tribal sovereignty principle has not been expressly derived
from any specific language in the Constitution.
Nor has there been, historically speaking, a basis for the
recognition of tribal sovereignty in the legislative pronouncement
of Congress. A review of congressional action over the last cen-
tury clearly indicates a cyclical vacillation between the contradic-
tory policies of Indian self-determination, which implicitly en-
dorse the tribal sovereignty concept, and policies of tribal ter-
mination, which deemphasize tribal autonomy in order to effect
the assimilation of the Indian into the American mainstream."
Thus, in the current state of theorization, the principle of tribal
sovereignty is not, strictly speaking, a principle of constitutional
law at all. It is a theory of Indian autonomy antedating the Con-
stitution which has never been coherently integrated into constitu-
tional jurisprudence. It has remained an anomaly. It is best
76. See, Indian Affairs, the President's Message to the Congress, 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 883, 905 (1970).
For example, the General Allotment (Dawes) Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat.
362, authorized the President to allot tribal lands in portions of a specified acreage to reser-
vation Indians in the hope that they would learn to accept the cultural values of the white
civilization in preference to the perceived "barbarism" of their communal society through
the private ownership of land. This policy was reversed by the Indian Reorganization
(Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, ch. 576 § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987, which vested "[any Indian
tribe..." with "the right to organize for its common welfare .... This statutory grant of
sovereignty neither persuasively confirmed nor negated any notion of inherent sovereignty.
The language can be viewed as an implicit recognition of an antecedent sovereignty or as a
legislative substitution of inherent powers with delegated powers or both. The 1950's mark-
ed a return to a policy of termination which only recently has once again been abandoned.
See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132. This concurrent resolution
declared that it was the policy of Congress "as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the
same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States .... " Id. Pursuant to this announced policy, Congress proceeded to pass Public Law
280 which extended the civil and criminal jurisdiction of certain states over Indian country
and also provided for the assumption of such jurisdiction by other states upon meeting cer-
tain conditions. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151,
1162, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1360. The law seriously circumscribed tribal sovereignty as it in-
validated tribal ordinances inconsistent with the law of the states whose jurisdiction had
been extended. See also H.R. REP. No. 84&, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1953).
Congress then proceeded to pass a number of acts which explicitly provided for the ter-
mination of federal supervision of certain reservations, pending the completion of specific
termination plans for each of the tribes affected. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68
Stat. 250, 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-901 (1976) (Menominee); Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat.
718, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564 (1976) (Klamath); Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768, 25
U.S.C. § 721 (1976) (Alabama and Coushatta tribes of Texas); Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch.
1207, 68 Stat. 1099, 25 U.S.C. §J 741-60 (Paiute).
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described as an extra-constitutional doctrine which the Supreme
Court has recognized largely for reasons of public policy, only to
the extent necessary to avoid aggravating the many injustices to
which the Indians have been subjected. It is a wholly discretionary
doctrine lacking any sort of principled infra-structure. The result
has been unpredictable applications of the doctrine without a
definitive explication of its contemporary constitutional justifica-
tion. This has led one commentator to the conclusion that "tribal
sovereignty seems to be a mere tool used by the courts in reaching
whatever decision.they think best."" The need for a unifying con-
stitutional approach is clear.
The Constitutionalization of the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty is presently in a very
precarious state of development. The holding in United States v.
Wheelei5 gives operative effect to the sovereignty principle but
without providing a systematic framework of analysis. Perhaps
the doctrine's durability in the annals of the law is in part at-
tributable to its powerful intuitive attractiveness as a means of
ventilating a rather ill-defined residuum of uniquely Indian in-
terests that have survived conquest and subjugation. Whatever
the explanation behind its tenacious capacity to endure, it is clear
that the doctrine should be put on a sounder constitutional
footing. It is in desperate need of a cogent theoretical infra-
structure that can withstand systemic political pressures and at-
titudinal bias.
Perhaps by explicitly constitutionalizing the doctrine, the Court
could provide it with a tenable theoretical foundation in modern
constitutional jurisprudence and bring analytical clarity to the
field in a single stroke. Constitutionalization of the doctrine would
entail the recognition that the sovereignty of tribes springs not
from some independent, abstract normative system, but from the
Constitution itself. Under this new approach, tribal sovereignty
would be accorded the same sort of limited sovereignty as that en-
joyed by the states with certain well-defined exceptions.79 Only
through constitutionalization can the doctrine meaningfully
describe the new relationship which the tribes have developed
77. Oliver, The LegalStatus of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REV. 193, 232 (1959).
78. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
79. Obviously, the sovereignty of the tribes would not be as complete as that of the
states. For example, under this new approach, the sovereignty of the tribes would not be
protected by the construction of the tenth amendment rendered in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), or by the guarantee of sovereign immunity from citizen suits
embodied in the eleventh amendment.
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with the federal government. In the alternative, it is submitted
that absent explicit constitutionalization, at the very least tribal
sovereignty questions should be resolved with reference to a state-
analogue. In other words, tribes should be recognized as func-
tionally more akin to the states of the Union, rather than foreign
nations. This note will attempt to justify the proposed constitu-
tionalization through three lines of analysis entailing (1) a new tex-
tual interpretation, (2) an evaluation of recent congressional pro-
nouncements, and (3) an assessment of the significance of the fre-
quent modern usage of analogies between state and tribal
sovereignties in the case law.
A New Textual Interpretation
Indians are mentioned twice in the Constitution. The first
reference is to the exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the
population tally which lonce determined the number of represen-
tatives a state would receive." This language has not been
definitively construed by the judiciary nor was there any discus-
sion of the phrase at the Constitutional Convention, but this
should not forestall further inquiry. The meaning of the phrase
can be gathered by its logical implication.
Why did the Framers assume that some Indians will not be taxed
by the states7 Perhaps it is an implicit recognition of the sovereign
immunity of the tribes from state taxation, a doctrine that has
long been applied by the Supreme Court. As a general rule, in-
herent tribal sovereignty immunizes the reservation Indians from
state taxation unless Congress expressly authorizes the state levy.'
Thus, there is plausibility in the assertion that the inclusion of
such a phrase in the text of the Constitution tends to suggest that
the Framers recognized some sort of sovereignty in the tribes. The
phrase, however, is not very helpful in elucidating the precise
nature of that sovereignty.
The second reference to Indians in the Constitution is much
80. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 2 as amended by amend. XiV § 2 andamend. XV. The phrase
"Indians not taxed" apparently refers to those Indians not taxed by the states. Today that
would include only the reservation Indians. Rice, supra note 3, at 80.
81. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1866) (holding that
tribal sovereignty plus federal preemption barred application of state tax laws to tribal
land:; and members); Pennock v. Commissioners, 103 U.S. 44 (1880) (allowing state taxa-
tion of lands owned by Indians whose tribe had ceased to be a sovereign entity). The
modern Court, however, while not abandoning the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, has
preferred to rest its decision on the more familiar notion of federal preemption. See, e.g.,
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n; 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co.
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691-92 (1965). See also COHEN, supra note 2, at
256.
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more illuminating. The third clause of Article I, Section 8 em-
powers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'" The
history of this allusion to the tribes is revealing.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had been
granted the power of "regulating the trade and managing all the
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provid-
ed that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not
infringed or violated .... .,".As the court in United States v. Forty-
Three Gallons of Whiskeyt would later point 'Out, the effective
state veto over federal regulatory prerogatives created by the
language in the Articles was viewed at the Constitutional Conven-
tion as rendering federal power "of no practical value."' James
Madison argued at the Convention that the states were simply
disregarding federal authority over Indian affairs.' In response to
Madison's repeated protests, the Convention ultimately agreed to
the wording currently found in the text, but only after the clause
had been twice narrowed in committee.$7
The second revision substituted in place of the words "and with
the Indians, within the limits of any State, not subject to the laws
thereof... ," the streamlined version, "and with the Indian
Tribes."8 A possible inference is that the Founding Fathers felt that
the words "Indian Tribes" adequately conveyed the meaning of
the earlier phraseology. Since the Framers took it for granted that
no tribe could be subject to state law under the Constitution, it
might have been thought redundant to refer expressly to Indians
"not subject" to state law. If indeed their object was the avoidance
of redundancy, it would appear that by implication the Conven-
tion had recognized under the Constitution a broad principle of
Indian sovereignty sufficient to immunize the tribes from the force
of state law. This interpretation of the Framers' intent neatly cor-
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
83. ART. CONFEDERATION, art. 9, 4.
84. 93 U.S. 188 (1876).
85. Id. at 194. SeePRUCHA, supra note 31, at 42.
86. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (1911-1937) [hereinafter
cited as FEDERAL CONVENTION]. Madison's initial objection apparently went unheeded as the
Committee of Detail, in charge of drafting the actual text of the Constitution, neglected to
include any provision establishing congressional power over the Indians. Id., vol. 2, 321;
PRUCHA, supra note 31, at 42.
87. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 86, at 367, 493, 495, 499. Professor Prucha has
noted that there is "little evidence that Indian matters entered into the debates over ratifica-
tion of the Constitution." PRUCHA, supra note 31, at 42 n.2. The original proposal submit-
ted by Madison was that Congress should have the power "to regulate affairs with the In-
dians ...." Id. See also C. WARREN, THE MAKING OFTHE CONSTITUTION 588-89 (1928).
88. Id.
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responds to the conclusion reached in Worcester v. Georgia"'
establishing that reservation tribes were beyond the pale of state
jurisdiction." Although this clause has typically been thought to
establish a source of federal power over Indian tribes, it would ap-
pear that there is some historical evidence tending to prove that
the clause may also be a source of a constitutionally cognizable
principle of tribal sovereignty.
Historical interpretations aside, a reading of the clause in its en-
tirety suggests an alternative rationale for constitutionalization.
According to the well-established canon of language construction,
noscitur a sociis, the meaning of a word may be derived from
those which it accompanies. The canon is particularly helpful
where the subject of construction consists of a string of phrases.
Applying that canon to Article I, Section 8, clause 3, it naturally
follows that the meaning of "Indian Tribes" is reflected in the
meaning of the words which it accompanies: "States" and "foreign
Nations." Both states and foreign nations possess some degree of
sovereignty. Hence, Indian tribes possess a degree of sovereignty.
The sovereignty of foreign nations is entirely extra-constitutional.
The sovereignty of states springs from the Constitution. Thus, by
command of the canon, the sovereignty of the tribes must be akin
to either the extra-constitutional sovereignty of foreign nations or
the derivative sovereignty of the states.
Application of the canon invites the drawing of an analogy. It
must be asked whether the sovereignty of the Indian tribes more
closely resembles that of foreign nations or that of the federal
states. Obviously, the Indian tribes today do not enjoy the unfet-
tered prerogatives of foreign states. Before resolving the issue, the
changing sociological conditions of the tribes and the evolutionary
nature of Indian law must be taken into account. The answer must
be formulated in the context of the Indian's contemporary political
status in the scheme of modern federalism. In that light, the
limited sovereignty of the tribes, at a functional level, most closely
parallels that of the states. Thus, the commerce clause might be in-
terpreted as having implicitly constitutionalized the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty since it can be read (1) as recognizing some sort
of limited sovereignty in the tribes, and (2) forging a persuasive
juristic analogy between the sovereignty of the tribes and that of
the states.
89. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
90. Id. at 561.
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Congressional Policy Considerations
Although Congress has in the past equivocated between policies
of self-determination and termination, recent legislative trends
evidence steadfast support of a program of constitutionalization.
The passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 19681 evidences this
new congressional endorsement of constitutionalization. Prior to
its passage, the general rule, whose parentage can be attributed to
Talton v. Mayes,2 had been that the Bill of Rights was not bind-
ing on tribal governments. In Talton, tribal immunity to the fifth
amendment was predicated on the quasi-sovereign status of the
Cherokees whose "powers of local self-government ... existed
prior to the Constitution .... ,' The 1968 Act responded to the in-
equities arising under the Talton rule"4 by replacing the separate
extra-constitutional standard applicable to the tribes with one
substantially the same as that applied to the state and federal
governments.9 ' While the Act overtly restricted the exercise of ar-
bitrary power by tribal governments, it did concommitantly ac-
cord some congressional recognition of tribal sovereignty. 6 One
study noted that the Act "represents a congressional effort to
strengthen tribal institutions while drawing them nearer to non-
Indian standards."' The Act illustrates the intention of Congress
to bring the tribes within the conceptual scheme of federalism
while simultaneously making more secure their right to tribal
autonomy. As such it constitutes a "new policy, not directly
descended from either the separationist or the assimilationist
line.""5 The new policy is a hybrid policy, similar to the one ad-
vanced in this note, which seeks to lessen the anomalous nature of
tribal autonomy by making it more analogous to other govern-
mental entities within the federal system. The congressional
policy, however, is founded only on a statutory analogy to the
91. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77.
92. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
93. Id. at 384. See also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 n.3
(1978).
94. See, e.g., Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 377 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474, 478 (D. Mont. 1965); W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE,
THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 37 (1966); Comment, The Indian Bill of Rights
and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1969).
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
96. See Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Indian Af-
fairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 23 at 16 [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 154191
(recognizing "quasi-sovereign" status of the tribes under the act). The language of the
statute itself also suggests congressional recognition of residual tribal powers of self-
government. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
97. Comment, The Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 481 (1970).
98. Id.
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Constitution, not on the Constitution itself. It is nonetheless in-
dicative of the need to bring theoretical coherence to the doctrine
of tribal sovereignty by reworking its constitutional underpin-
nings.
Analogies between State and Tribal Sovereigns
An additional indication of the trend toward conceptualizing
tribal sovereignty in constitutional terms is evident in the frequent
case law analogy utilized by modern courts, between the states of
the Union and the various tribes. The judiciary probably does not
consciously pursue this decisonal pattern. Rather, the analytical
difficulties which inhere in a sui generis legal doctrine such as
tribal sovereignty inexorably cause the courts to rely on analogy.
The majority opinion in United States v. Wheeler? exemplifies
this decisional process. The Wheeler Court invoked the dual
sovereignty doctrine to allow successive tribal and federal pro-
secutions for offenses arising out of the same circumstances. The
doctrine had formerly been applied only to the states.'" Since the
tribal courts in question had been created by congressional
statute, there was substantial force in the argument ultimately re-
jected by the Court that there was an identity of sovereignties
between tribal and federal courts. The majority resisted the temp-
tation to analogize the tribe to territories,' °' municipalities,' °2 or
mere agencies of the federal government."3 Instead, the Court
chose the states as the appropriate analogue' in the face of many
old precedents which might have been invoked to defeat the
analogy.'"
It is also interesting to note that the standard formulated in
Williams v. Lee," which tests the legitimacy of state regulatory in-
trusions on tribal sovereignty, is extremely similar to the standard
developed by the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 17
which determines the legitimacy of federal regulatory intrusions
99. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
100. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410
(1847).
101. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,318-19 (1978).
102. Id. at 320-21.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 330-32. The analogy is never made entirely explicit but is present in the
Court's comparison of the consequences that flow from the application of the dual
sovereignty doctrine to the states and to the tribes.
105. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. So. K. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 653 (1890).
106. 358 U.S. 217(1959).
107. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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on the sovereignty of the states. In both cases the Court decided
that some regulation was permissible as long as it did not
unreasonably circumscribe the inherent governmental
prerogatives of a limited sovereign.'" Thus, the Court's concep-
tualization of a constitutional standard designed to accommodate
the competing interests of separate sovereignties in a federal
system was strikingly similar where encroachment on state and
tribal sovereignties was threatened.
Conclusion: The Consequences of Constitutionalization
Several consequences flow from constitutionalization that ap-
pear logically self-evident. First, it should be -made clear that the
authority of Congress over the tribes would remain largely unim-
paired. Constitutionalization, however, would probably ex-
tinguish the congressional power of tribal termination. Congress
would be free to regulate the tribes just as it had done in the past,
except that it could no longer terminate tribal existence. Such ab-
solute power is prima facie inconsistent with any notion of con-
stitutionally protected sovereignty. Termination could only be ef-
fected with the consent of the tribes. This development would prob-
ably be viewed with favor by contemporary Indians who can still
remember the governmental and economic debacle that followed
earlier congressional attempts to terminate the tribes.'" Aside from
this salutary restriction, Congress would continue to enjoy
plenary authority over tribal affairs.
Second, constitutionalization would circumscribe the applica-
tion of the divestiture-by-implication principle announced in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe."' Constitutionalization
would probably raise a strong presumption that the challenged
tribal power had not been lost as a result of the intervention of the
supervening sovereignty of the United States. Divestiture could
only be achieved by meeting a very heavy burden of proof. Plain-
tiff would have to show, in essence, that the challenged tribal
power is inherently inconsistent with subordinate sovereign status
in a federal system. In short, plaintiff would have to show that the
power which the tribe had attempted to exercise is one which
would also be beyond the pale of state authority. Of course,
where Congress has withdrawn the power, any attempted exercise
108. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1956), with
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
109. V. DELORIA, CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 60-82 (1969); WASHBURN, supra note 21, at
216.
110. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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would be conclusively presumed invalid. Since the power denied
the tribe in Oliphant was one which the states would not normally
enjoy by virtue of their inherent constitutional sovereignty, but
only by virtue of congressional delegation, that case can be read as
being consistent with this new approach.'"
111. In Oliphant, the Court denied the Suquamish Tribal Court the power to assert
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, i.e., a citizen of a different sovereignty. Without
express congressional consent, states may not assume criminal jurisdiction over the tribes.
Here Congress had authorized the assertion of criminal jurisdiction. Thus, it would appear
that there is no inherent state power to assert criminal jurisdiction over a citizen from a
distinct sovereignty within the federal system.
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